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A Major Change for Minor Victims: A
Call to Amend Rhode Island’s Statute
of Limitations for Children’s Medical
Malpractice Suits
Brandon Ruggieri*
INTRODUCTION

In Rhode Island the statute of limitations for medical
malpractice suits, codified at Section 9-1-14.1(1) of the Rhode
Island General Laws, mandates that a plaintiff’s medical
malpractice action be brought within three years from the time of
the plaintiff’s alleged injury.1 However, if the plaintiff is a minor
and such an action has not been brought on her behalf within the
three year time period, then the plaintiff must bring the action
within three years of reaching the age of the majority.2 Thus,
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2018;
B.A., Stonehill College, 2015. Thank you to Professor Carl Bogus and
Christopher Moran for all of your guidance and support throughout the
writing process.
1. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
2. Section 9-1-14.1 provides, in relevant part, that:

Id.

[A]n action for medical . . . malpractice shall be commenced within
three (3) years from the time of the occurrence of the incident which
gave rise to the action; provided, however, that: (1) One who is under
disability by reason of age . . . and on whose behalf no action is
brought within the period of three (3) years from the time of the
occurrence of the incident, shall bring the action within three (3)
years from the removal of the disability.
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Section 9-1-14.1(1) offers a minor plaintiff “two windows” in which
to bring her claim: (1) a claim that may be brought on her behalf
by a parent or guardian within three years of the injury or
reasonable discovery of the injury; or (2) a claim that the minor
may bring on her own behalf anytime from the ages of eighteen to
twenty-one.3 Nevertheless, in spite of these two windows, minor
victims of medical malpractice are often not provided with a fair
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated in the courts.
In 2015, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reaffirmed the
meaning and purpose of Section 9-1-14.1(1). In Ho-Rath v. Rhode
Island Hospital, the court held, as a matter of first impression,
that medical malpractice claims seeking to recover for injuries
sustained by a minor may be brought by the minor’s parents or
guardians either within three years from the date of the alleged
malpractice incident, or by the minor on her own behalf within
three years of reaching the age of majority.4 The majority’s
“landmark decision”5 was countered by Justice Flaherty’s dissent;
he argued that the better interpretation of the statute would be to
“provide minors on whose behalf no suit has been filed within
three years of an act of negligence the benefit of the tolling
provision inherent in Section 9-1-14.1(1) and allow them to file
suit at any time up until three years after they attain the age of
majority.”6
In 2010, Jean and Bunsan Ho-Rath (Plaintiffs) sued Rhode
Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women and Infants’ Hospital of
Rhode Island, and numerous associated medical professionals7
(Defendants) on behalf of their minor daughter Yendee Ho-Rath,
who was born on January 9, 1998.8 Plaintiffs claimed that
Defendants were negligent in the diagnosis and treatment of
3. See id.
4. 115 A.3d 938, 948 (R.I. 2015).
5. MELISSA D. BERRY ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND TORT REFORM 34
(2016), Westlaw HPTSIB 09-26-16.10.
6. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (emphasis added).
7. These medical professionals included Lewis Glasser, M.D., William
Ferguson, M.D., Fred Schiffman, M.D., and B.E. Barker, Ph.D., who were all
associated with Rhode Island Hospital and Miriam Hospital; and Calvin E.
Oyer, M.D., Jami Star, M.D., and Marsha Sverdup, M.S. f/k/a Marsha
Pagnotto, M.S., who were all associated with Women and Infants’ Hospital of
Rhode Island. Id. at 941 nn.2–3.
8. Id. at 941.
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Yendee’s genetic blood disorder, alpha thalassemia, and “also
asserted individual claims against each of the Defendants for the
loss of consortium of Yendee.”9 Specifically, “[P]laintiffs alleged
that, although genetic testing for thalassemia was conducted on
Jean, Bunsan, and Yendee’s older brother as early as 1993,
[D]efendants had failed to correctly test, diagnose, and treat
[P]laintiffs, resulting in Yendee being born with a debilitating
genetic disorder.”10 In 2011, the trial court dismissed the case on
the grounds that the statute of limitations had run since Plaintiffs
waited twelve years to initiate their claims on behalf of Yendee.11
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed this decision and held
that Section 9-1-14.1(1) permitted Yendee to sue on her own
behalf when she reached the age of eighteen.12 The court also
held that Plaintiffs’ derivative loss-of-consortium claims may be
brought alongside Yendee’s claim when she turns eighteen.13
In the lone dissenting opinion, Justice Flaherty found that the
proper interpretation of Section 9-1-14.1(1) would allow the minor
to bring suit at any time up until three years after she turns
eighteen.14 Justice Flaherty argued that this
interpretation
would achieve the legislative purpose of Section 9-1-14.1(1)
because it would “eliminate[e] drawn-out litigation, which can,
and does, occur in personal injury suits brought under Section 9-119, while not abrogating a minor’s right to relief or mandating
that her claim grow stale in the intervening years before she
reaches the age of majority.”15
This Comment will not challenge the court’s interpretation of
the statute, but rather will examine Ho-Rath, along with its
relevant precedent, to determine if Section 9-1-14.1(1) provides
minor medical malpractice victims with a fair opportunity to have
their claims adjudicated. Using Justice Flaherty’s dissenting
opinion in Ho-Rath as a preliminary base, this Comment will
argue that the statute should be changed because it forces a
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 942. The facts provided failed to identify when Yendee’s
genetic condition was discovered by Plaintiffs, and did not explain the reason
for the twelve-year delay in Plaintiffs’ action. See id. at 941–42.
12. Id. at 948.
13. Id. at 951.
14. Id. at 952 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 956.

2017]

MINORITY TOLLING PROVISIONS

673

blameless minor to wait years before she can bring suit, and in the
most extreme circumstances up to fifteen years.16 As Justice
Flaherty argues, “during this period, doctors may relocate, retire,
or die; hospitals may close or merge; and records may become
misplaced or lost.”17 In order to avoid these potential risks, this
Comment will propose an amendment to Section 9-1-14.1(1) that
would allow minors to bring suit at any time up until they turn
twenty-one, and thus would provide minor victims of medical
malpractice in Rhode Island with a better opportunity to have
their claims adjudicated.
This Comment examines both arguments in favor of and
against Section 9-1-14.1(1) and concludes that the statute does not
provide minor victims of medical malpractice with a fair
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated. Part I outlines the
relevant history of Section 9-1-14.1(1) and discusses three
important cases predating Ho-Rath, which have addressed minor
medical malpractice actions. Part II analyzes the arguments in
support of and against Section 9-1-14.1(1), explaining why this
statute does not provide minor victims with a fair opportunity to
have their claims adjudicated and proposes an amendment to the
statute. Part III compares Section 9-1-14.1(1) to other states’
statutes of limitation. This Comment concludes by arguing in
favor of changing the law in order to allow minors to bring a
medical malpractice suit anytime up until they reach the age of
twenty-one.
I.

THE HISTORY OF RHODE ISLAND’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS

Under state law, the statute of limitations for a plaintiff’s
claim may be “tolled” until some event, specified by law, takes
place.18 Tolling provisions in state law are intended to benefit a
plaintiff by extending the time period in which he or she is
permitted to bring suit.19 Characteristically, a statute of
limitations is tolled because of some supposed impediment to the
16. Id. at 955.
17. Id.
18. 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 246, Westlaw (database
updated June 2016).
19. See id.
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plaintiff’s pursuit of his or her claim.20 These impediments that
trigger the tolling of a statute of limitations may vary from state
to state, but often include minority, mental disability,
imprisonment, or service in the armed forces.21
In Rhode Island, the general provision for the tolling of the
statute of limitations for personal injury claims of minors is
Section 9-1-19 of the Rhode Island General Laws.22 This
provision, “which has been in existence[] without significant
change[] for over one hundred years,”23 provides in pertinent part:
If any person at the time any such cause of action shall
accrue to him or her shall be under the age of eighteen
(18) years, or of unsound mind, or beyond the limits of the
United States, the person may bring the cause of action,
within the time limited under this chapter, after the
impediment is removed.24
Section 9-1-19 of the Rhode Island General Laws operates for
the protection of a minor.25 Pursuant to this provision, “a suit
may be brought on behalf of a minor plaintiff in a personal injury
action at any time until the minor reaches the age of majority,
after which time the minor has three years to file suit on his or
her own behalf.”26 When read alone, this general tolling provision
provides minors with a significant opportunity to have their
personal injury claims adjudicated because their suit may be
brought at any time up until they turn twenty-one years old.
However, during the 1970s, this general tolling provision was
viewed as giving minors too broad of a protection in medical
malpractice actions; thus, Rhode Island General Assembly enacted
Section 9-1-14.1(1).27

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-19 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
23. Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 944 (R.I. 2015).
24. § 9-1-19 (Westlaw).
25. See id.
26. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 944 (citing Bishop v. Jaworski, 524 A.2d 1102,
1102–03 (R.I. 1987)); Bliven v. Wheeler, 50 A. 644, 644 (1901)).
27. See infra Section I.A.1.
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A.

Rhode Island’s Limitation on Minors’ Medical Malpractice
Claims

1.

The 1970s Medical Malpractice Crisis: Purpose and Historical
Context of Section 9-1-14.1(1)

During the 1970s, the United States faced a medical
malpractice crisis, which resulted in “huge increases in insurance
premiums and the departure of some insurance carriers from
malpractice underwriting.”28 In 1976, the Rhode Island General
Assembly enacted Section 9-1-14.1,
[A]s a legislative response to a medical malpractice crisis
in the state. Faced with the crisis, the Legislature had
legitimate interests in limiting the number of medical
malpractice suits but, at the same time, in providing
victims of medical malpractice with a fair opportunity to
have their claims adjudicated in the courts.29
Accordingly, Section 9-1-14.1(1) was intended to streamline
the litigation of medical malpractice cases involving minors, while
at the same time acting as a limitation on the general tolling
provision for minors set forth in Section 9-1-19.30 While this
statute has succeeded in its intended purpose of limiting the
number of medical malpractice suits in Rhode Island, questions
remain whether this limitation gives minor victims a fair
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated.
2.

Malpractice Statute of Limitations in the Rhode Island Courts
Pre-Ho-Rath

Ho-Rath was not the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s first
encounter with minor medical malpractice actions. Three cases
are of particular importance: Bakalakis v. Women & Infants’
Hospital,31 Dowd v. Rayner,32 and Rachal v. O’Neil.33 Together
28. Glen O. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970’s: A
Retrospective, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5.
29. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 946 (quoting Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679,
681 (R.I. 1995)).
30. Id.
31. 619 A.2d 1105 (R.I. 1993).
32. 655 A.2d 679 (R.I. 1995).
33. 925 A.2d 920 (R.I. 2007).
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these cases have helped to shape the law that governs minor
medical malpractice and personal injury actions in Rhode Island.
In Bakalakis, the court held that Section 9-1-14.1(1) is the only
statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions
and thus is not superseded by Section 9-1-19.34 In this case, the
parents of a minor victim filed suit against numerous medical
professionals, alleging negligent care at the time of birth of their
son.35 The suit was filed within three years of the son’s birth.36
Subsequently, more than three years after their son’s birth, the
minor’s parents moved to amend their complaint to add two
additional doctors as defendants.37 The court rejected the parents’
amended complaint and concluded that if parents file suit on
behalf of a minor within three years of the alleged occurrence of
malpractice, the parents cannot add new defendants after the
three-year window has expired.38
In 1995, the Dowd court held that Section 9-1-14.1(1) did not
violate equal protection or the Rhode Island State Constitution.39
Like Bakalakis, the plaintiffs in Dowd sought to amend their
complaint in order to add additional medical professionals as
defendants, but waited over seven years to do so.40 In this case,
the court took the opportunity to comment on the legislative
purpose of Section 9-1-14.1(1), and concluded that this provision
restricts “multiple suits or amended complaints filed against
additional defendants on a serial or piecemeal basis.”41 According
to the court, this statute ensured that minors were not
disadvantaged by their disability during their minority, while at
the same time protecting possible defendants from stale claims.42
Finally, in 2007, the court held in Rachal that Section 9-114.1(1) is a legislatively carved out exception to the general tolling
provision for minors in Section 9-1-19.43 In Rachal, a minor’s
parents filed a personal injury suit on his behalf against the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Bakalakis, 619 A.2d at 1107.
Id. at 1106.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1107.
Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 680 (R.I. 1995).
See id.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Rachal v. O’Neil, 925 A.2d 920, 927 (R.I. 2007).
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owner of a skate park, requesting damages for skateboarding
injuries sustained on a half pipe at the park.44 More than a year
later, the parents sought to amend their complaint to add the
skate park as a defendant, but the lower court denied their
motion.45 The court affirmed this decision and concluded that
under Section 9-1-14.1(1) “a parent[’s] . . . suit on behalf of a child
for certain types of professional malpractice removes that child’s
malpractice claims from the protection a tolling statute would
otherwise offer.”46
3. Ho-Rath
In Ho-Rath, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was obligated to
apply the plain meaning of Section 9-1-14.1(1).47 According to the
statute, “[o]ne who is under disability by reason of age . . . and on
whose behalf no action is brought within the period of three (3)
years from the time of the occurrence of the incident, shall bring
the action within three (3) years from the removal of the
disability.”48 Even though the Ho-Rath majority correctly applied
the plain meaning of Section 9-1-14.1(1),49 Justice Flaherty’s
dissent highlights the tension between what the law requires and
the unfortunate results that can harm “blameless” children.50 To
afford minor victims of medical malpractice a fair opportunity to
have their claims adjudicated, Rhode Island’s statute must be
amended.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE AMENDMENT

Section 9-1-14.1(1) of the Rhode Island General Laws does not
provide minors with a fair opportunity to have their claims
adjudicated because the statute sometimes forces the minor to
wait years before they can bring suit if the minor’s parents have
failed to bring a claim on the minor’s behalf.51 This statute
44. Id. at 922.
45. Id. at 922–23.
46. Id. at 925.
47. Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 943 (R.I. 2015).
48. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
49. See 115 A.3d at 944, 946–47.
50. See id. at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
51. See § 9-1-14.1.
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currently creates a serious conflict between the interests of the
child and the interests of the State of Rhode Island. On the one
hand, both the minor and the minor’s family have an interest in
seeking relief in a timely manner to compensate for the alleged
harm that the minor suffered. On the other hand, Rhode Island
has an interest in streamlining medical malpractice litigation and
in protecting possible defendants from stale claims.52 Although
there are strong arguments on both sides, in order to properly
protect the minor victim and provide the minor with a fair
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated, Section 9-1-14.1(1)
must be amended to allow a minor’s claim to be brought at any
time up until the minor reaches the age of twenty-one.
A.

Arguments in Support of the Amendment

1.

The Prolonged Period of Exposure and a Minor Victim’s Right
to Relief

Section 9-1-14.1(1) of the Rhode Island General Laws must be
amended to better protect a minor’s right to relief and to ensure
that minors are afforded a fair opportunity to have their claims
adjudicated within a reasonable time period. By enacting
Section 9-1-14.1(1), the Legislature sought to limit the number of
medical malpractice claims and eliminate drawn-out medical
malpractice litigation.53 Although Section 9-1-14.1(1) has largely
succeeded in its intended purpose, its success has come at a high
cost to minor victims. As Justice Flaherty described in Ho-Rath, if
a minor’s parent is not diligent in bringing suit on behalf of the
minor, then Section 9-1-14.1(1) will “abrogate[e] a minor’s right to
relief or mandate[e] that [a minor’s] claim grow[s] stale in the
intervening years before [they] reach[] the age of majority.”54
Accordingly, Section 9-1-14.1(1) must be amended to prevent this
abrogation of a minor’s right to relief.55
Section 9-1-14.1(1) “prolongs the period of exposure to
malpractice suits, and thus is inconsistent with [its] purpose of

52. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 947 (majority opinion); Dowd v. Rayner,
655 A.2d 679, 681–82 (R.I. 1995).
53. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 946.
54. Id. at 956 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 955–56.
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limiting malpractice litigation.”56 In fact, amending the statute
might speed up litigation because missing the first three-year
window would not necessitate that the minor wait until she
reaches the age of majority to bring the action. Additionally, the
intervening years before the minor reaches the age of eighteen
could affect a minor’s right to relief. While some changes in
circumstances may be beneficial—such as recovering from the
alleged injury—many run the risk of being detrimental to the
minor and their future claim. As Justice Flaherty described in HoRath, a minor’s doctor “may relocate, retire, or die; hospitals may
close or merge; [or] records may become misplaced or lost.”57 In
some circumstances, a minor may even die from her injuries (or
other causes) without ever having the opportunity to bring suit.58
To protect minors from these potential risks, they should be
allowed to bring their claim at any time before they turn twentyone.
The risks that may occur during the intervening years before
the minor turns eighteen undermine the minor’s fair opportunity
to have the minor’s claims adjudicated. Time is of the essence in a
minor’s medical malpractice suit. With each passing year, the
potential harms that a minor may face grow in number and in
likelihood, adding unnecessary obstacles to the minor’s suit and
ultimately hurting the minor’s possibility of success in her future
legal action. For example, consider Yendee’s case in Ho-Rath:
although she may bring suit when she turns eighteen, many
things can occur during the six intervening years.59 First, if her
doctor, who allegedly misdiagnosed and improperly treated her
blood disorder at birth, were to relocate or retire, she may have a
difficult time locating and bringing suit against that doctor.60
Second, if her doctor were to die during that time, she could lose
56. William Jordan, Minors’ Medical Malpractice Claims May Be Brought
by Parents Within Three Years of Date of Malpractice, or by Minors Within
Three Years of Date of Majority, PROF’L LIAB. REPORTER (Thomson Reuters),
July 2015, at NL 25, Westlaw 40 No. 7 Professional Liability Reporter NL 25.
57. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Gretchen R. Fuhr, Civil Procedure/Tort Law—Better Off
Dead?: Minority Tolling Provision Cannot Save Deceased Child’s Claim, 31
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 491, 491 (2009) (child admitted to hospital for pain
caused by sickle cell anemia and died next day from morphine overdose).
59. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
60. See id.
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the ability to bring any possible claims against him.61 Finally, if
the hospital where her alleged injury took place closed or burned
down, she may lose her medical records.62 Thus, Section 9-114.1(1) could force the minor’s claim to “grow stale” and may
result in a loss of evidence.63 By forcing a minor to wait years
before she may bring her claim—in the most extreme cases up to
fifteen years—Section 9-1-14.1(1) prolongs a minor’s period of
exposure to malpractice suits, potentially nullifies a minor’s right
to relief, and diminishes a minor’s chances of success in her future
litigation.64
2.

Birth Injuries and “Dormant” Symptoms

Section 9-1-14.1(1) must be amended to better protect a minor
who has suffered an injury at birth and a minor whose symptoms
do not arise until later in the minor’s life. A birth injury is “an
impairment of the neonate’s body function or structure due to an
adverse event that occurred at birth.”65 During the birthing
process there is an increased risk of injury to not only the mother,
but the infant as well.66 Some injuries cannot be avoided due to
complications during the mother’s pregnancy or at birth, while
others occur as a result of a medical professional’s negligence.67
For example, during delivery, an infant may become oxygen
deprived or suffer “broken bones, lacerations, or skull fractures”
due to the malpractice of a medical professional.68 Similarly, as
seen in Ho-Rath, the improper diagnosis and treatment of a blood

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id.
See id.
See id.; Jordan, supra note 56.
See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
Tiffany M. McKee-Garrett, Neonatal Birth Injuries, WOLTERS
KLUWER (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.uptodate.com/contents/neonatal-birthinjuries.
66. “The 10 most common birth injuries include: Brachial Plexus Palsy
(Erb’s Palsy . . . ), bone fractures, cephalohematoma, caput succedaneum . . . ,
perinatal asphyxia, intracranial hemorrhage, subconjunctival hemorrhage,
facial paralysis; spinal cord injuries; and cerebral palsy . . . .” Birth Injury
Statistics, BIRTH INJURY GUIDE, http://www.birthinjuryguide.org/birthinjury/statistics/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
67. See id.
68. Birth
Injury
Types,
BIRTH
INJURY
GUIDE,
http://www.
birthinjuryguide.org/birth-injury/types/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
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disorder may also result in an injury to the child.69 As discussed
below, these injuries and their symptoms vary from one infant to
another. Accordingly, Section 9-1-14.1(1) must be amended in
order to protect all minors who suffer from birth injuries and to
account for the many differences in their injury-related symptoms.
Section 9-1-14.1(1) must also be amended to shield those minors
whose birth injury symptoms remain dormant for several years
into a minor’s life. A minor’s birth injury may be temporary, while
others may result in “permanent disabilities and
disfigurement.”70 The related symptoms of these birth injuries
range in severity and differ in time of emergence.71 Often times
the symptoms for certain birth injuries are immediate and can be
recognized—possibly even treated—while the infant remains in
the hospital.72 However, sometimes a child and her parents do
not become aware of the child’s birth injures until later in the
child’s life.73 These dormant symptoms may take years to surface
and “signs of birth injuries [may not be] seen until [the] child
develops
through
growth
stages
or
begins
school.”74
Consequently, if a child’s symptoms do not emerge within the first
three years of a child’s life or do not become “reasonab[ly]
discover[able,]” then the child’s parents may be barred from filing
a claim pursuant to Section 9-1-14.1(1).75
Under Section 9-1-14.1(1), children who have suffered a birth
injury may be forced to wait years before they can file a claim due
to their dormant symptoms.76 For example, consider these two
situations: (1) an infant suffers a birth-related injury due to a
medical professional’s malpractice, but her symptoms do not
develop until the child is four years old; and (2) a medical
professional fails to adequately diagnose and treat an infant’s
disorder, but symptoms of that disorder do not arise until the child
is twelve years old. In each of these circumstances, if the child’s
parents fail to bring a claim within three years of the discovery of
69. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 941 (majority opinion).
70. Birth Injury Symptoms, BIRTH INJURY GUIDE,
http://www.
birthinjuryguide.org/birth-injury/symptoms/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 946 (R.I. 2015).
76. See, e.g., id.
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the child’s symptoms then Section 9-1-14.1(1) will bar the child’s
parents from ever bringing a claim on their child’s behalf. Though
both children will be given the opportunity to bring suit upon
turning eighteen, they must wait years in order to do so.
Although birth injuries have become increasingly rare due in
part to modern advancements in medical technology, such injuries
will continue to occur both naturally and at the hands of medical
professionals. Today, “[o]f every 1,000 infants born in the United
States, 6 to 8 of them are born with a birth injury. That means
that approximately 1 in every 9,714 people in the U.S. are born
with a birth injury.”77 To respond to this ongoing issue, it is
imperative that the Legislature amend Section 9-1-14.1(1). A
child’s claim should not be mandated to “grow stale” as a result of
a delayed emergence in the child’s symptoms.78 It is unacceptable
to force a child to wait years to bring their own claim due to such
circumstances, which are outside of the child’s control. Rather,
children should be granted a longer period of time in which to
bring their claim, so that their lawsuit is not unnecessarily
delayed. Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) will safeguard young
victims and afford them a better chance of procuring damages for
their injuries by granting them this extended period of time.
3.

Reduce the Burdens Placed on Minors and Their Families

Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) would protect minor victims
from unforeseeable circumstances which are outside of their
control. Medical malpractice litigation involving minors is often
burdensome on all parties involved. However, such litigation can
be especially burdensome on minors and their families.79 One
burden which arises from Section 9-1-14.1(1) is that a minor is
powerless under the law until she reaches the age of eighteen.80
Until that time, the minor must rely on her parent to bring a
claim on her behalf, and if her parent fails to do so, then the minor
77. Birth Injury Statistics, supra note 66 (“Based on this information,
28,000 per year are born with a birth injury, which is 2,333 per month, 538
per week, 76 per day, and 3 per hour.”).
78. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 956 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
79. In addition to financial burdens from having to wait years without
compensation for damages, there may also be emotional burdens on the
minor and the family due to the highly sensitive information in the case.
80. See 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch.
542 of Jan. 2016 Sess.).
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is forced to wait to bring her own claim.81 By forcing a minor to
wait, this statute punishes a minor for her parent’s failure to
bring suit within three years of the minor’s alleged injury.
Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) will free minors from
punishment and lighten the burden that the statute currently
places on minors and their families. Under Section 9-1-14.1(1), a
parent’s failure to bring suit may be the result of: (1) a lack of
diligence;82 (2) a lack of knowledge;83 or (3) the inability to bring
suit.84 Although the causes of a parent’s failure may differ, a
minor’s punishment remains the same—she will be forced to wait
for years before having the opportunity to bring her own claim.
Currently, Section 9-1-14.1(1) does not distinguish between a
parent’s mistake, inability, or decision, but instead focuses on the
mere fact that a claim was not brought within three years of the
alleged injury.85 However, by amending Section 9-1-14.1(1),
minors will no longer be punished for their parent’s failure to sue
on their behalf. Rather, this amendment will combat these causes
and grant a minor a better opportunity to seek relief.
Allowing a minor’s claim to be brought at any time until she
turns twenty-one will benefit all parties involved in the litigation.
This amendment would give minors a better opportunity to be
heard in court, and may even lead to more timely litigation, as
parents will no longer be barred from bringing claims on their
children’s behalf. Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) could actually
speed up litigation because if the minor’s parent misses the first
window, the minor would not have to wait until reaching the age
of majority to bring the claim. Moreover, allowing a minor’s
parent to bring a claim at any time will preserve evidence,86 which
81. See id.
82. As discussed supra Section II.A.1, this occurs when a parent knows
of a minor’s injury, but does not bring a timely suit in court within three
years of the alleged injury. See, e.g., Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 680 (R.I.
1995).
83. As discussed supra Section II.A.2, this occurs when a parent is
unaware of the minor’s injury, and may not become aware of the injury until
after three years have passed from the time the alleged injury took place.
84. Parents of the minor may not have the financial means to fund a
lawsuit, or the physical or legal ability to bring a claim within three years of
the alleged injury.
85. See § 9-1-14.1(1) (Westlaw).
86. The theories in support of this argument are: (1) if suits are
permitted to be brought at any time up until a minor turns twenty-one it will
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would assist both parties in support of their arguments and aid
the courts in making their rulings. However, critics of amendment
argue that forcing a defendant (hospital, doctor, or other medical
professional) to defend a claim at any time, for potentially twentyone years, is burdensome on the defendant.87 While this may be a
valid concern, it may be more acceptable to place this greater
burden on possible defendants, rather than on a minor.
Defendants, such as doctors, hold themselves to a high
professional standard: they keep detailed medical records of
patients and often have the means to hire defense counsel.
Overall, these defendants, as compared to minor victims, are
much better equipped to handle the rigors associated with
litigation. Minors, on the other hand, must rely on their parents
to bring a claim on their behalf, hire an attorney, and obtain
evidence that is not readily available to them. Although
amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) may place a greater burden on
defendants, it will ultimately benefit both parties involved in the
litigation by permitting lawsuits to be brought earlier and
encouraging the preservation of evidence.
B. Argugments Against the Amendment
1.

The Children’s Medical Malpractice Crisis

Opponents to the amendment would argue that this change
could result in a children’s medical malpractice crisis, similar to
what occurred in Rhode Island during the 1970s.88 They would
fear that the amendment will: (1) cause an increase in medical
result in plaintiffs, and possible defendants, preserving evidence (i.e. medical
records) that may be necessary to support their positions in future litigation;
and (2) if there are less intervening years between the alleged injury and the
suit, there will most likely be more evidence to preserve. See Ho-Rath, 115
A.3d at 955–56 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., id. at 947 (majority opinion).
88. See Robinson, supra note 28, at 6 (footnotes omitted) (“For health
care providers the immediate crisis was essentially twofold: a sudden and
substantial increase in malpractice insurance premium rates and, worse, the
threat that liability coverage would become unavailable at any price as a
consequence of carrier withdrawal from the field. For the carriers
themselves, the crisis was an unanticipated increase in both the number of
claims filed for negligent injuries and the amounts recovered. Rising
underwriting costs were compounded by investment losses that a nationwide
recession inflicted on insurance companies along with other investors.”).
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malpractice litigation in Rhode Island; and (2) lead to “huge
increases in insurance premiums” for children’s
medical
coverage.89 First, opponents will likely argue that such an
amendment would directly conflict with the purpose of
Section 9-1-14.1(1), which was to limit the number of medical
malpractice suits in the state.90 By allowing a minor’s claim to be
brought at any time, the Legislature would not only encourage,
but also enable more suits to be brought in the courts. While an
increased ability to sue may be beneficial for minor plaintiffs, the
resultant influx of litigation may tie up the courts and, in turn,
slow down the state’s judicial processes. Second, as a result of this
influx, the cost of insuring children may increase, making it
expensive for families to pay for medical coverage. Moreover,
hospitals and medical professionals, fearful of being sued, would
most likely charge higher prices for children’s care. Nonetheless,
these fears are unfounded because today’s society is very different
when compared to the 1970’s due to advancements in technology,
health insurance, and medical malpractice law. As of now,
opponents have offered no evidence that an amendment to
Section 9-1-14.1(1) will result in increased litigation or that
today’s legal and healthcare systems could not withstand such an
increase if it occurred.
2.

Protecting Defendants and Encouraging Reasonable Diligence

Opponents would argue that amending Section 9-1-14.1(1)
fails to protect defendants from stale claims.91 As previously
discussed, one intended purpose of Section 9-1-14.1(1) was to
protect defendants from long, drawn-out litigation.92 This statute
sought to encourage parents of minor victims “to act diligently in
bringing claims on behalf of minors” within three years of the
minor’s injury.93 Moreover, as seen in Dowd and Bakalakis, by
limiting litigation to two distinct windows of opportunity, the
Legislature wanted to protect possible defendants who could be
added to ongoing suits.94 This limitation “restrict[s] . . . multiple
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 5.
See Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I. 1995).
See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 948.
See Dowd, 655 A.2d at 682.
Jordan, supra note 56.
Dowd, 655 A.2d at 681–82; Bakalakis, 619 A.2d 1105, 1107 (R.I.
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suits or amended complaints filed against additional defendants
on a serial or piecemeal basis.”95 Thus, opponents argue that the
amendment would force defendants to be subject to stale claims
and leave other potential defendants vulnerable to being included
in a minor’s ongoing or future litigation.96 Although these are
reasonable concerns for defendants, it is the current statute that
mandates that claims grow stale by forcing the minor to wait
years before bringing her claim. An amendment to Section 9-114.1(1), on the other hand, seeks to limit stale claims and speed
up litigation by eliminating the waiting period to allow a minor to
bring a claim at any time until her twenty-first birthday.
3.

Safeguarding a Minor’s Right to Relief

Opponents to the amendment argue that Section 9-1-14.1(1)
does not abrogate a minor’s right to relief because it affords a
minor two windows of opportunity.97 As previously discussed, this
statute: (1) permits a parent to bring suit on the minor’s behalf;
and (2) protects the minor “if [her] parents or guardians fail to act
diligently” in bringing suit.98 Although the minor may be exposed
for a longer period of time, her parents’ failure to bring suit will
not bar her own personal action. Upon turning eighteen, the
minor will be given the opportunity to seek relief on her own
behalf no matter how many years have passed since the time of
her injury. The only burden placed on the minor is that she
personally will have to wait until she reaches eighteen to file a
claim.99 Therefore, opponents argue that Section 9-1-14.1(1)
should stand because it safeguards a minor’s right to relief by
granting her two opportunities to bring a claim. However,
because the current statute subjects the minor to a longer period
of exposure, she is not given a fair opportunity to seek relief.
Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1)’s provides minors with a better
opportunity because it limits the period of exposure by allowing
their claims to be brought earlier.

1993).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Dowd, 655 A.2d at 682.
See, e.g., Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 950.
See id. at 950–51.
Jordan, supra note 56.
See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 950.
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C. Proposed Amendment
In light of these concerns, this Comment proposes that
Section 9-1-14.1(1) be amended as follows: an action for medical
malpractice involving an alleged minor victim shall be commenced
at any time up until three (3) years after she has attained the age
of the majority. One who is under disability by reason of age, and
on whose behalf no action is brought, shall bring the action within
three (3) years from the removal of the disability.
III. RHODE ISLAND’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS COMPARED TO OTHER
STATES

Across the United States, states have statutes of limitation
that govern medical malpractice claims, and “[t]he majority of the
states have special provisions regarding the time limits for minors
to file medical malpractice claims.”100 The purpose of a state’s
statute of limitations is not only to protect defendants from longdormant claims, but also to encourage plaintiffs to bring an action
with reasonable diligence.101 However, each state’s statute seeks
to accomplish this purpose in different ways. States’ statutes of
limitation for medical malpractice claims generally fall within four
broad categories: (1) those that do not have special provisions for
minor victims; (2) those that have special provisions for minor
victims; (3) those that provide “two windows” of opportunity; and
(4) those that do not count the time period before a minor’s
eighteenth birthday as part of the time limit imposed by the
state’s general statute of limitations.102
A.

States Without Special Provisions for Minors

State statutes that fall within the first category are the most
restrictive on a minor’s claim. While the majority of states have
special provisions regarding the time limits for minors to file
100. See Heather Morton, Medical Liability/Malpractice Statutes of
Limitation,
NAT’L
CONF.
ST.
LEGISLATURES (Mar.
20,
2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medicalliability-malpractice-statutes-of-limitation.aspx.
101. Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of
Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L. J. 453, 488 (1997).
102. See Morton, supra note 100 (providing comprehensive list of state
statutes dealing with statutes of limitation for medical malpractice claims).
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medical malpractice claims, there are some states that do not. For
example, in Connecticut and Louisiana, an action brought on
behalf of the minor must adhere to the same general statute of
limitations governing medical malpractice claims.103 Unlike
Rhode Island, these states do not provide minor victims with
additional time in which to bring their claim, but rather mandate
that a claim on the minor’s behalf be brought within one to three
years after the date of the alleged injury or discovery.104 Thus,
state statutes such as those found in Connecticut and Louisiana,
which do not have special provisions for minor victims, are
considered to be among the most restrictive on a minor’s claim.
B.

States with Special Provisions for Minor Victims of Medical
Malpractice

State statutes that fall within this second category are more
restrictive on a minor’s claim than Rhode’s Island’s current (and
amended) statute. Some states have special provisions for minor
victims under a certain age that limit the time in which an action

103. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2017
Legis. Sess.) (“No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real
or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton
misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist,
chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years
from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no
such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or
omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any
such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.”);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (Westlaw through 2016 First Extraordinary, Regular,
and Second Extraordinary Sess.) (“No action for damages for injury or death
against any physician, chiropractor, nurse, licensed midwife practitioner,
dentist, psychologist, optometrist, hospital or nursing home duly licensed
under the laws of this state, or community blood center or tissue bank . . .
whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of
patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the
alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery
of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed
within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims
shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the
alleged act, omission, or neglect. The provisions of this Section shall apply to
all persons whether or not infirm or under disability of any kind and
including minors and interdicts.”) (emphasis added).
104. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Westlaw); LA. STAT. ANN. §
9:5628 (Westlaw).
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may be brought on their behalf. For example, in Massachusetts,
the statute of limitations provides that minors under the age of six
have only until their ninth birthday for a claim to be brought on
their behalf or else they will be barred from bringing suit.105
Unlike Rhode Island’s statute, Massachusetts’s statute fails to
provide minors with a second “window” of opportunity when they
reach the age of majority. Although statutes within this category
provide minor victims with some additional protection, children
are left without a second chance at relief if their parents fail to
bring a claim on their behalf within the designated time period.
C. States that Provide “Two Windows” of Opportunity
Similar to Rhode Island, there are a number of states that
provide minor victims of medical malpractice with “two windows”
of opportunity. For example, in New Hampshire and Ohio, a
medical malpractice action involving a minor victim may: (1) be
brought on behalf of the minor after the injury or reasonable
discovery of the injury;106 or (2) be brought by the victim when
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60D (Westlaw through 2016 2nd
Annual Sess. and ch. 1 of 2017 1st Annual Sess.) (“[M]inor[s] under the full
age of six years shall have until his ninth birthday in which the action may
be commenced, but in no event shall any such action be commenced more
than seven years after occurrence of the act or omission which is the alleged
cause of the injury upon which such action is based except where the action is
based upon the leaving of a foreign object in the body.”).
106. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4(1) (Westlaw through ch. 1 of 2017 Reg.
Sess.) (“[A]ll personal actions . . . may be brought only within 3 years of the
act or omission complained of, except that when the injury and its causal
relationship to the act or omission were not discovered and could not
reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act or omission, the action
shall be commenced within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its
causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.”); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2305.113(C)–(D) (Westlaw through 2017–2018 Legis. Sess.) (“No
action upon a medical . . . claim shall be commenced more than four years
after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of
the medical . . . claim. If an action upon a medical . . . claim is not
commenced within four years after the occurrence of the act or omission
constituting the alleged basis of the medical . . . claim, then, any action upon
that claim is barred. If a person making a medical claim . . . could not have
discovered the injury resulting from the act or omission constituting the
alleged basis of the claim within three years after the occurrence of the act or
omission, but, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, discovers the
injury resulting from that act or omission before the expiration of the four-
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reaching eighteen.107 While the time limits for each window vary
from state to state, what is common within this category is that
minors are provided with two chances to seek relief.108
It is evident from this comparison that Rhode Island’s
Section 9-1-14.1(1) is liberal as compared to several other state
statutes that fall within sections A and B; however, it is more
restrictive than states in section D discussed below. Opponents to
amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) will argue that there is no need to go
further because Rhode Island provides minor victims of medical
malpractice with two fair opportunities for relief, while some
states have no special provisions for minors or place greater
restrictions upon them. However, as previously discussed, there
are issues that can arise when a state chooses to adopt a “two
window” statute. To this point, Rhode Island has taken necessary
steps to ensure that minor victims have a better chance at relief,
but more can be done. Rhode Island should commit to making the
process as accessible as possible to minors by adopting amended
Section 9-1-14.1(1).

year period . . . , the person may commence an action upon the claim not later
than one year after the person discovers the injury resulting from that act or
omission. If the alleged basis of a medical claim . . . is the occurrence of an
act or omission that involves a foreign object that is left in the body of the
person making the claim, the person may commence an action upon the claim
not later than one year after the person discovered the foreign object or not
later than one year after the person, with reasonable care and diligence,
should have discovered the foreign object. A person who commences an
action upon a medical claim . . . under the circumstances described in . . . this
section has the affirmative burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the person, with reasonable care and diligence, could not have
discovered the injury resulting from the act or omission constituting the
alleged basis of the claim within the [stated] period[s] described in . . . this
section . . . .”).
107. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:8 (Westlaw) (“An infant or mentally
incompetent person may bring a personal action within 2 years after such
disability is removed.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.16 (Westlaw) (“[I]f a
person entitled to bring an[] action mentioned in [section 2305:113] . . . is, at
the time the cause of action accrues, within the age of minority or of unsound
mind, the person may bring it within the respective times limited by [section
2305:113], after the disability is removed.”).
108. Today, there are approximately thirteen states that have adopted a
similar version of this “two window” statute: Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont. See Morton, supra note
100.
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States that Do Not Count the Time Period Before a Minor’s
Eighteenth Birthday

Some states have already implemented statutes similar to
amended Section 9-1-14.1(1) that are less restrictive on a minor’s
claim than Rhode’s Island’s current statute. These states do not
count the time period before a person’s eighteenth birthday as
part of the time limit imposed by the state’s general statute of
limitations. For example, in Arizona and the District of Columbia,
the time restriction placed on a minor does not begin to run until
after the minor reaches the age of eighteen.109 Unlike in Rhode
Island, a claim that is brought on behalf of a minor is not subject
to the general statute and may be brought at any time until the
minor turns eighteen.110 However, when the minor reaches
eighteen the statute of limitations will begin to run, and they
must bring a claim within the designated time.111 Other states
including New York and North Dakota have passed similar
statutes, but have added an additional time restriction that limits
how long the extension of the statute lasts.112 For example, in
North Dakota, “the extension of the limitation due to infancy is
limited to twelve years[,]” meaning that the period within which
the action must be brought cannot exceed twelve years after the
minor’s injury occurred.113 Thus, these statutes are considered to

109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (Westlaw through 2017 First Reg.
Legis. Sess.) (“If a person . . . is at the time the cause of action accrues either
under eighteen years of age or of unsound mind, the period of such disability
shall not be deemed a portion of the period limited for commencement of the
action. Such person shall have the same time after removal of the disability
which is allowed to others.”); D.C. Code Ann. § 12-302 (Westlaw through Mar.
12, 2017) (“[W]hen a person entitled to maintain an action is, at the time the
right of action accrues . . . under 18 years of age . . . he or his proper
representative may bring action within the time limited after the disability is
removed.”).
110. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (Westlaw); D.C. Code Ann. §
12-302 (Westlaw).
111. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (Westlaw); D.C. Code Ann. §
12-302 (Westlaw).
112. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208 (MCKINNEY Westlaw through 2017 Legis.
Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-25 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
113. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-25 (Westlaw); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R.
208 (MCKINNEY Westlaw) (“The time within which the action must be
commenced shall not be extended by this provision beyond ten years after the
cause of action accrues . . . .”).
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be among the most lenient in the country because the time period
before the minor’s eighteenth birthday is not counted as part of
the statute’s time limit.
CONCLUSION

Rhode Island General Laws Section 9-1-14.1(1) does not
provide minor victims of medical malpractice with a fair
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated. Under Section 9-114.1(1), if a minor’s parents fail to bring a claim her behalf, then
she is forced to wait years before she may bring her own claim. As
Ho-Rath illustrates, by mandating a minor’s claim to “grow stale,”
it subjects the minor to a long period of exposure and, ultimately,
“abrogat[es] a minor’s right to relief.”114 To afford minors a better
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated, Section 9-1-14.1(1)
must be amended to permit a minor’s claim to be brought at any
time up until the minor reaches the age of twenty-one.115
“Minority tolling provisions, [like amended Section 9-114.1(1),] enable minors to realize the full scope of the harm
inflicted on them before filing suit.”116 This amendment seeks to
minimize harm to a minor by shortening the period of exposure
and enabling a minor’s claim to be brought at any time, rather
than restricting it to two windows of opportunity under the
current statute. By permitting lawsuits to be brought earlier, the
Rhode Island General Assembly would encourage the preservation
of evidence, reduce the number of potential risks that threaten
minor victims’ claims, and ultimately increase minors’ likelihood
of
success
in
their
litigation.117 Moreover,
amending
Section 9-1-14.1(1) would further the goals of the tort system as
minor plaintiffs will have “an opportunity to be heard and can be
compensated for their losses while physicians [will be] deterred
from wrongdoing.”118 This major change for minor victims will
help to ensure that a defendant’s negligence does not
go
overlooked or unpunished in the State of Rhode Island.

114. Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 956 (R.I. 2015) (Flaherty, J.,
dissenting).
115. Id. at 955.
116. Fuhr, supra note 58, at 533.
117. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955–56.
118. Fuhr, supra note 58, at 533.

